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With this number the & niversity of Chicago Law Review concludes its
tenth volume, celebrates its tenth anniversary. To the student editors
this is, excusably we hope, a moment of pride and of satisfaction. At
the same time, the decreased student enrollment makes difficult the
effective continuance of student control. To assure the continued exist-
ence of the Review, therefore, the faculty will assume editorship with the
next volume for the duration.
NOTES AND RECENT CASES
OWNERSHIP AND INCOME TAXATION
THE CLIFFORD DOCTRINE
The effect of the Clifford doctrine on family trusts and short-term trusts has
been scrutinized and evaluated. x Much has been made of the various tests
proposed in the leading case, and its devolution through the circuit courts of ap-
peals has been discussed. There is reason to believe, however, that consideration
has been unduly restricted to family trusts and that a cloudy interpretation has
resulted from this overemphasis on the domestic character of the facts present
I See James, Family Trusts and Federal Taxes, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 427 (1942); Pavenstedt,
The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine, 51 Yale L.J.
213 (1941); Case, The Circuit Courts of Appeals Examine the Clifford Doctrine, 7 Md. L. Rev.
201 (1943). Case cites other treatments of the Clifford doctrine at 201 note 2.
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in the leading case. There is reason to believe, furthermore, that the full im-
plication of the Clifford doctrine can be more clearly understood if the Clifford
case is considered in conjunction with some more or less contemporaneous cases
involving related problems. The main purpose of this note is to review the com-
ponents of the "doctrine" with a view to ascertaining whether it is properly
relevant only to the family trust which engendered it.
Since 1939 the United States Supreme Court has had occasion to ascertain
the income tax liability of a donor in three closely allied types of cases. In one
type the problem centered on the family trust; in another, the problem was
presented by the establishment of a trust in favor of the settlor's estranged wife;
in the third, a gift of income caused the litigation. Each class has contributed
to the ascertainment of a settlor's liability for the income of a trust. The cases
will be discussed in the order given.
In Helvering v. Clifford,2 the settlor named himself trustee of a five-year trust
in favor of his wife with reversion to himself. In addition, he reserved to him-
self all the rights with respect to management which he had had before the trust
was established, including the right to vote the stock and to include extraordi-
nary income as principal rather than distributable income. Mr. Justice Douglas,
in holding the income taxable to the settlor, remarked that the intimate rela-
tionship of the settlor and the beneficiary, plus the short term of the trust, were
important to his decision. But these remarks must not be taken to mean that a
short-term trust or a family trust are per se the causal factors compelling the
imposition of income tax liability on the settlor of such trusts.3 They are mere-
ly evidential, relevant to the ascertainment of operative facts.
This seems a reasonable inference from the use made by Mr. Justice Douglas
309 U.S. 331 (1940). The following are companions to the Clifford case: Helvering v.
Wood, 309 U.S. 344 (1940); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941); Helvering v. Richter,
312 U.S. 561 (I94i); cf. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
3 Short-term trusts in favor of one's relatives, without more, should not incur liability to the
settlor under the Clifford rule. Compare Jones v. Norris, 122 F. 2d 6 (C.C.A. 10, 194). Un-
fortunately, no case precisely in point has yet arisen. See Case, op. cit. supra note i at 210,
note 34a. But it is evident that the term of the trust is not the decisive factor when it is con-
sidered that in the following twelve cases, all involving long-term trusts, six were decided for
the taxpayer, five for the government, and one was remanded: Com'r v. Bateman, 127 F. 2d
266 (C.C.A. i, 1942); Suhr v. Com'r, z26 F. 2d 283 (C.C.A. 6, 1942); Com'r v. Armour, 125 F.
2d 467 (C.C.A. 7, X942); Com'r v. Betts, 123 F. 2d 534 (C.C.A. 7, 1941); Jones v. Norris,
122 F. 2d 6 (C.C.A. Xo, I941); Com'r v. Branch, 114 F. 2d 985 (C.C.A. 1, 1940). Not all the
following cases (decided for the government) were controlled by the Clifford doctrine. In the
first case, for example, the income of the trust was taxed to the settlor under sections 166-67
of the I.R.C. 49 Stat. 1707 (i936), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ I66-7 (1940), which provide for taxation to
the settIor in cases involving revocable trusts or trusts the income of which may be used for
the benefit of the settlor when agreed to by a party not having a substantial adverse interest.
Nevertheless, the cases sufficiently illustrate that factors other than the term of the trust
are most important. Downie v. Com'r, 133 F., 899 (C.C.A. 6, 1943); Hogle v. Com'r, 132
F. 2d 66 (C.C.A. 10, 1942); Williamson v. Com'r, 132 F. 2d 489 (C.C.A. 7, 1942); Brown v.
Com'r, 31 F. 2d 640 (C.C.A. 3, 1942); Com'r v. Buck, 12o F. 2d 775 (C.C.A. 2, 1941).
Bush v. Com'r, 133 F. 2d 1005 (C.C.A. 2, 1943), was remanded; see infra note 13.
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of section 22(a) 4 and from the tenor of his language. The issue, according to the
Associate Justice, "is whether the grantor after the trust has been established
may still be treated, under this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus." s
The other facts, namely, the family solidarity, the term, and the control are
important because they "lead irresistibly to the conclusion that respondent
continued to be the owner for purposes of § 22(a)."6
That the Clifford doctrine is even more than a question of control7 is dem-
onstrated by Mr. Justice Douglas' answer to the argument that the settlor re-
tained only the type of dominion exercised by any trustee: "Since the income
remains in the family and since the husband retains control over the investment,
he has rather complete assurance that Ithe trust will not effect any substantial
change in his economic position." s This statement is also potentially mislead-
ing. Considered alone, it would inspire the conclusion that maintenance of the
family assets, rather than the economic position of the settlor, is the essential fact
in the complex.
Such a conclusion is unsound, however, both on the theory of the income tax
laws and from the implications of the cases. As Judge Magruder has said, "it
might be rational for Congress under the concept of family solidarity to tax all
family income as a unit.9 Butverydefinitely Congress has not done this ..... ,0
As a matter of fact, it is fairly clear that Mr. Justice Douglas was maintaining
the distinction between benefit to the settlor and benefit to the family, for in the
same paragraph he returned to his analysis of the effect of the trust on the over-
all position of the settlor: "When the benefits flowing to him indirectly through
the wife are added to the legal rights he retained, the aggregate may be said to
be a fair equivalent of what he previously had."
The second line of cases indicates more clearly that, not family solidarity, but
the effect of the trust on the settlor's individual economic position is the essen-
tial consideration. The standard pattern in these cases is a trust in favor of an
estranged wife with more or less control retained by the husband. It has been
generally held that the income from such a trust will not be included in the
settlor's gross income if it appears that, under the law of the state in which the
divorce is granted, the trust acts as a complete discharge of the settlor's legal
obligation of support.- In Helvering v. Fuller12 the standard facts were roughly
4 52 Stat. 457 (1938), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a) (194o) is the general definition of gross income
and has not been substantially changed throughout the years.
s Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (194o). 6 Ibid., at 335.
7 Cf. Com'r v. Chamberlain, 121 F. 2d 765 (C.C.A. 2, 1941).
8 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1946).
9 See James, Irascible Comments on the Revenue Laws, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 58, 63 (1941).
10 Com'r v. Bateman, 127 F. 2d 266, 271 (C.C.A. i, 1942).
-Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 U.S. r (i935); Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (i94o); Hel-
vering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 8o (i94o); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (i94o); Pearce v. Com'r,
315 U.S. 521 (1942).
12 31o U.S. 69 (i94o).
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present, and the Court held the income from the trust not taxable to the settlor
because under Nevada law the trust acted as a complete expiation of the settlor's
obligation of support. Despite the absence of an intimate family group such as
existed in Helvering v. Clifford, however, Mr. Justice Douglas said that the rule
of the Clifford case might have been applicable had the Commissioner alleged
and proved the amount of control requisite to indicate that the settlor had suf-
fered no economic harm in virtue of the trust.
The dictum'3 in the Fuller case expressly subtracts one qualifying element
arguably present in the Clifford doctrine: family solidarity is not a prerequisite
to taxation of the income of a trust to its settlor. The important issue is whether,
after the trust is established, an economic benefit remains in its settlor. Clearly,
the concept of economic benefit is basic to the present problem. The third group
of cases illuminates the contours of the concept.
These cases involve a gift of income;4 the problem is whether the income so
given is to be taxed as income of the donor. In Lucas v. Earl,s Mr. Justice
Holmes held that a contractual transfer of one-half of a husband's income to
his wife would not negate the husband's income tax liability for the amount so
transferred. The interesting aspect of the Earl case is that the taxability was
not articulated on the concept of economic benefit to the donor. Indeed, ac-
cording to Mr. Justice Holmes, a "very forcible argument" against taxing the
donor resided in thefact that the economic benefit was in the donee. The hold-
ing against the donor was based, therefore, on the theory that the revenue code
purported to tax income to the one who earned it. Since counsel's argument,
admittedly "very forcible," was nevertheless rejected, it seems reasonable to
infer either that the benefit accruing from such an assignment was not con-
sidered as of primary importance, or that it was not relevant.
Though the Earl case was perhaps the most important precedent for the
holding in Helvering v. Horst,6 Mr. justice Stone's opinion in the latter case
presents a significant contrast to the theory utilized in Lucas v. Earl. In Helver-
ing v. Horst an owner of bonds detached negotiable interest coupons and de-
livered them to his son, who cashed them at maturity (all within the same year).
The income so transferred was held taxable to the donor. In so holding, how-
ever, Mr. Justice Stone abandoned the salient from which Mr. justice Holmes
',This dictum has probably been transmuted to a bona fide holding by virtue of an appli-
cation made in Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942). There it was held that the income of
a trust in favor of adult children, otherwise not taxable to the settlor, might be held taxable to
him if a rehearing should establish that he had retained such powers that "it must be said the
taxpayer is the owner of its income." In Bush v. Com'r, 133 F. 2d ioos (C.C.A. 2, 1943),
Judge Frank said that Helvering v. Stuart compelled him to remand a case which, prior to the
Stuart holding, he would have adjudged for the taxpayer. The trust involved in the Bush case
was in favor of an estranged wife for her life with no reversion in the settlor but reserving cer-
tain management rights.
X4 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. ii (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 3I U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering
v. Eubank, 3I U.S. 122 (1940); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (i94i). A full discussion
of these cases, treated from the point of view of their effect on family trusts, may be found
in James, op. cit. supra note i, at 439-41.
'S 281 U.S. XII (1930). 16 VIx U.S- 112 (1940).
TIE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
had operated: the donor in the Horst case was subjected to income tax liability
because the Court felt that he had received a full measure of economic benefit
from the interest coupons, even though the beneficial interest appeared to be
in another.
If the Cliford case stands for the proposition that income of a trust will be
taxed to its settlor when he retains substantial ownership, then cognizance of
the attitude toward ownership displayed in the Horst case is indispensable to
any useful understanding of the Cliford doctrine.'7 According to Mr. justice
Stone, "the power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it.
The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the
enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income by him who exercises it.' '28
In applying this proposition to the specific facts before him, the present Chief
justice said: "When by the gift of the coupons [the donor] has separated his
right to interest payments from his investment .... he has enjoyed the eco-
nomic benefits of the income ..... ,9
These statements, like signs pointing to the moon, are clearly so general as
to be useless to draftsmen of tax-avoidance trusts. But they are neither vague
nor misleading; they are a clear proclamation that a gift must involve the cor-
pus20 and an absolute abandonment thereof in order for the donor to avoid in-
come taxation thereon.21
As amplified by the theory of economic benefit expressed in the Horst case,
the Clifford doctrine might appear drastic even to one not preoccupied with the
17 For examples of how the rules of the Clifford and Horst cases merge, see Com'r v. Buck,
12o F. 2d 775 (C.C.A. 2, 1941) and Brown v. Com'r, i31 F. 2d 640 (C.C.A. 3, 1942). To the
taxpayer's argument that the income of a trust was not taxable to him because he had de-
prived himself of certain of his prior rights, the court in the Buck case answered that the
donor's retained power to dispose of the income was the equivalent of ownership of it (citing
the Horst case). See further, Pavenstedt, op. cit. supra note i, at 214.
18,311 U.S. 112, xi8 (194o). Compare the following statement made in Harrison v. Schaff-
ner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (1941): ...... one vested with the right to receive income [does] not
escape the tax by any kind of anticipatory arrangement, however skilfully devised, by which he
procures payment of it to another, since, by the exercise of his power to command the income,
he enjoys the benefit of the income on which the tax is laid."
19 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (i94o). Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940),
goes beyond the Horst case in holding an assignment of renewal commissions on insurance al-
ready sold taxable to the assignor. The Buck case, note 17 supra at 778, makes the point
that in Helvering v. Eubank the assignor had relinquished all rights over what might be
termed analogous to the corpus of a trust, whereas in the Horst case he had not. Since there is
no mention in the Eubank case of any intimate relationship between the assignor and assignee,
moreover, it may be to the Horst case what Helvering v. Fuller is to the Clifford case. See text
supra at note 13.
"0 The bonds in the Horst case may properly be considered analogous to the corpus of a
trust.
2 Under Helvering v. Eubank, note 19 supra, any gift of incme maybe taxed to the donor,
but since Blair v. Com'r, 3oo U.S. 5 (1937), is still ostensibly good law, a life assignment by a
trust beneficiary of part of his trust income will not be taxed to the donor if the gift is absolutely
without strings. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1941), for a discussion of this
point.
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problems of tax avoidance. Every trust, indeed every gift, involves at least
psychic income to the donor; and it is not at all clear that the donor in the Horst
case enjoyed a more substantial satisfaction. But the problems are harrowing
more in contemplation than in application. Guided by the underlying notion
that the income of a trust is to be assessed to the donor only when from all the
facts it appears that tax avoidance rather than an abnegation of ownership is
intended, the circuit courts of appeals have hewn a rough but practical concep-
tion of what constitutes the type of continuing ownership interdict under the
blended doctrine of the Clifford and Horst cases.
Thus, in Com'r v. Chamberlain,- the court held that the income of a short-
term trust in favor of a university was not taxable to the settlor, though he
named himself a co-trustee. The nonfamilial character of the trust was con-
sidered highly important by the court, but only because it was relevant to the
ascertainment of whether the benefits to the settlor of a family trust were pres-
ent in the trust before the court. While recognizing that the view of the Horst
case is an integral part of the Clifford doctrine, the court said: "We cannot be-
lieve the Horst case means that every settlor of a trust is taxable upon whatever
part of its income is applied to purposes the furthering of which gives him satis-
faction."23
Again, when a mother established a trust in favor of an adult daughter who
had established her own home, the court found little difficulty in distinguishing
the Horst and Clifford cases. There was recognition that in a sense the family
relationship of the Clifford case was present, but in holding for the taxpayer the
court noted that "the trust here effectuated a substantial change in the set-
tlor's economic position.'124
These cases indicate that the doctrine is no more unwieldy than other rules
of law. And if this is so, objections based upon its generality are in the unfor-
tunate position of having proved too much. To the objection that Mr. justice
Stone's criterion is unfair, it may be answered that he probably did not intend
to abolish the institution of the bona fide gift, even among members of a family.
Limitations on gifts of income do not present insuperable difficulties to one who
actually intends to impoverish himself. In addition, the combined effect of the
Clifford and Horst cases works well within the scheme of the internal revenue
code. There can be little doubt that Congress was thinking of a bona fide settle-
ment when it provided that a trust should be taxed as a separate entity.25
Economic benefit, ordinarily translated as control, is the touchstone of in-
come taxation according to the Horst and Clifford cases. It has been revealed
elsewhere that the mechanical approaches-the term of the trust, the identity
of the parties, and so on-are important only insofar as they throw light on the
2121 F. 2d 765 (C.C.A. 2, 1941).
23 Ibid., at 766.
34 Com'r v. Armour, 125 F. 2d 467, 469 (C.C.A. 7, 1942).'
2s See Pavenstedt, op. cit. supra note z, at 2,7.
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position of the settlor with respect to the trust.26 As has been proposed in this
note, moreover, the reasoning of the Clifford case was not limited to family
trusts. It remains now to demonstrate that the blended doctrine of the Clifford
and Horst cases has found sound application far from the family scenes which
stimulated it.
That essentially the same features are present emerges when it is considered
that close friends may be even more obliging trustees than members of the
family. Again, the "realization of benefit" to the settlor (discussed in the Horst
case) when the beneficiary is a-son, is practically the same when he is a de-
voted friend.27 The doctrine should be similarly applied in similar situations.
Thus, the observation 58 that most trusts involve "a continuing exercise by
the settlor of a power to direct the application of the income,"'-9 applies as
well to gifts of income or trusts in favor of a stranger as to those in favor of
one's relatives. The mere fact that a trust is in favor of a stranger or even a
charity, therefore, should not detract from a rigorous analysis aimed at ascer-
taining whether a substantial economic benefit remains in the settlor despite
the transfer in trust. So, when in a related type of case one makes a gift to his
wife of a one-half interest in his business, the issue is not decided merely by the
presence of a family relationship; the decision rests, rather, on the inquiry
whether the donor has suffered an economic harm from the transfer. The court
must decide whether "for all practical purposes [the donor has] surrendered
nothing."3°
Further afield, the Clifford doctrine has found application in ascertaining the
party (as between vendor and purchaser) liable for the income from oil lands
and in imposing income tax liability on a corporation for dividends distributed
to its stockholders by another. In Anderson v. Helvering,3' income tax liability
was assessed against the purchaser of oil lands for the proceeds from the produc-
tion and sale of oil, though pursuant to an agreement he paid over those pro-
ceeds to the vendor. Citing the Clifford case, Mr. Justice Murphy said that
taxability depended on the extent of the various interests.32 Again, in U.S. v.
Joliet & Chicago Ry. Co.,33 a corporation was held taxable on dividends paid to
its shareholders by its lessee, the lease providing for such payment. "The con-
26 Ibid., at 221 et seq. See Case, op. cit. supra note i; Merrills, Status of Short Term
Trusts and Trusts Where the Control Remains in the Grantor, 28 Wash. U.L.Q. g (1943);
cf. note 3 supra.
'7 See Brown v. Com'r, 131 F. 2d 64o (C.C.A. 3, 1942).
28 See James, op. cit. supra note i, at 435, 440.
29 Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 67o, 682 (1933).
30 Earp v. Jones, 131 F. 2d 292, 294 (C.C.A. 10, 1942). 3' 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
32 Ibid., at 407: "It is settled that the same basic issue determines both to whom income
.... is taxable and to whom a deduction is allowable. That issue is, who has a capital in-
vestment .... and what is the extent of his interest."
33 3,5 U.S. 44 (1942).
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clusion that the dividend payments made to respondent's stockholders were in-
come realized by it," Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out, "marks no innovation in
income tax law ..... 'Income is not any the less taxable income of the tax-
payer because by his command it is paid directly to another in performance of
the taxpayer's obligation to that other.' "34
These cases are distinguishable from each other and from the types dis-
cussed above; yet, a common element exists in all. It is fairly easy to see that a
corporation should pay income tax on income distributed to its stockholders, or
that one should be taxed on income used by him to discharge a continuing obli-
gation of support.3s Little violence is done, moreover, when the Court compels
a man to pay income tax on the income from land in which he has the capital
investment and of which he may direct the exploitation. The common element
in these cases is the dominion over a thing which constitutes the major premise
of the most sophisticated notions of ownership.36 With this in mind, taxation of
the income of a trust to one who has retained the right to vote the stock compos-
ing the corpus, for example, does not seem a tour de force. And the opinion in
the Horst case, besides its straightforward warning, refines the elemental con-
ceptions of ownership relevant to income taxation.
PICKETING FOR CLOSED SHOP-CON-
STITUTIONALLY ENJOINABLE?
The defendant union, aiding a strike for a closed shop, was enjoined from
picketing. On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the decree,
asserting that it did not violate the First Amendment. Fashioneraft v. Halpern.'
It has now been almost two years since the United States Supreme Court held
picketing to be guaranteed under the right of free speech.2 During that time,
critics have been skeptical of the doctrine;3 state courts and lower federal courts
have shown a decided distaste for it;4 and the Supreme Court itself has twice re-
stricted its applicability. First, in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmnoor
34 Ibid., at 49.
3S See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. i54 (1942) (settlor held taxable for all the income of a
trust which might be used for the maintenance and support of his minor children).
36 Ames, The Nature of Ownership, in Lectures on Legal History 192 (3913); cf. Holmes,
The Common Law 2o6 et seq. (is8i).
x 48 N.E. 2d (Mass. x943). 2 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (i94i).
3 Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. i8 (1942); Gregory, Peaceful Picket-
ing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (r940). But see Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme
Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1037 (1943); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech:
A Dissent, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1942); Sherwood, the Picketing Cases and How They Grew,
io Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 763 (1942).
4 The attitude of these courts is discussed in Objective Tests for Determining the Legality
of Labor Activities, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1143 (1943); Ratner and Come, The Norris-La Guardia *
Act in the Constitution, ix Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 428 (z943); Teller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 453.
